Introduction
"A picture is a poem without words" -Horace When we look around and perceive our world, we constantly try to order what we see and give everything structure: we categorize and classify in order to efficiently capture surrounding events, recognize their importance, and subsequently react adequately to them. Thus, we constantly give meaning to everything we see, by ordering events according to underlying rules. One way to classify such rules that humans use comes from linguistics and originally refers to how sentences are processed. Accordingly, a sentence can either be processed by the meaning it conveys -its semantics, or by the inherent structure -its syntax, i.e. how the different components of the sentence, the words, are ordered.
This way of automatically structuring our perception has been first reported to occur when reading and interpreting simple sentences, and was supported by neurophysiological data. Recording an Electroencephalogram (EEG) of participants, it could be shown that semantic inconsistencies in sentences elicit a clear negative deflection in the EEG signal at around 400 ms, the N400 component, whereas other, more physical violations -e.g. words that are larger than normal -elicit a positive deflection in the EEG signal, peaking after 600 ms (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980a , 1980b . It is also roughly in this same time window, i.e. in a P600 component, in which the neural response to detecting a syntactic violation can most likely be found (Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992) , providing strong evidence for distinct neural generators of semantic and syntactic processing (Gunter, Stowe, & Mulder, 1997; Neville, Nicol, Barss, Forster, & Garrett, 1991) . Brain imaging studies further support the distinction between semantic and syntactic processing on a neuroanatomical level, with different, only partly overlapping areas of the mainly left-lateralized frontal cortex involved in semantic vs. syntactic processing (Friederici, Opitz, & von Cramon, 2000; Vigliocco, 2000) .
Such findings were also expanded to other, related domains of perception. For instance, it has been shown that detecting meaning and/or structure in music can be considered as analogous to semantic and syntactic processing, respectively, in sentences, with strong overlaps in event related potential (ERP) components, most likely stemming from neural activity in frontal and temporal brain networks (Sammler et al., 2013) . Processing musical meaning elicits an N400 component (Koelsch, 2011) , musical structure-such as chord progression, harmony, and key-relatedness-an early negativity and a P600 (Fitzroy & Sanders, 2013; Koelsch, Gunter, Wittfoth, & Sammler, 2005; Patel, Gibson, Ratner, Besson, & Holcomb, 1998) .
More generally, it can be argued that as an efficient way of organizing perception, semantic and syntactic integration allows to transform the perceived input from a linear sequence of elements to hierarchically organized patterns that convey meaning (Patel, 2003) . Thus, beyond being relevant for processing complex man-made signals that rely on well-defined combinatorial principles, semantic and syntactic processing should also apply in other, more generalizable settings. Visual scene processing is one such general context in which this likely is the case, as evidenced in several studies. Exchanging the last word in a sentence with a picture that is semantically incongruent to the rest of the sentence, elicits a very similar N400 deflection as a semantically incongruent word does (Ganis, Kutas, & Sereno, 1996; Nigam, Hoffman, & Simons, 1992) ; this demonstrates that semantic processing is not strictly limited to word understanding, but rather reflects a more general conceptual system. Similarly, it has been shown that in a visual narrative, i.e. in a simple and coherent chain of unfolding events displayed in a sequence of pictures, the disruption of a constituent elicits a P600 (Cohn, Jackendoff, Holcomb, & Kuperberg, 2014) ; this finding indicates that the narrative structure of visual sequences is processed in a similar fashion as syntax in language, with comparable, overlapping neurocognitive mechanisms.
However, these studies still investigate visual scene processing in a relatively artificial and confined setting, only distantly relating to what actually happens when we perceive our environment in an everydaylife relevant setting, with an often multi-layered structure, incredibly rich in details that vary in their contextual importance. When we view such a scene and detect one or more objects in it, those objects always form complex relational connections to other objects and the overall background setting of the scene (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982) . There has been early evidence for the notion that a complex schema of the perceived objects and their relations to each other is formed within a first fixation on such a scene, and that this schema integrates multiple types of information, i.e. structural ones (for example: prepositional rules: the cup is on the table) and meaning related ones (the scene portrays people sitting at the bar, drinking coffee), among others (Biederman, 1977) . Most commonly, the schema that is formed in everyday-life visual scene perception is investigated by including objects in a visual scene, which violate certain expectations regarding the underlying schematic structure (e.g. the cup is under the table) and/or meaning (e.g. the scene portrays a man and an octopus sitting at the bar, drinking coffee). When integrated into a complex scene, such objects have been found to draw attention to them, as indicated by the amount and duration of fixations and the developing scanpath of observers, recorded via eye-tracking (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978) . Even though the peripheral, extrafoveal attention initially doesn't seem to be altered, such inconsistent objects elicit longer fixations once they have been spotted (Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth, 1999; Vo & Henderson, 2009) , most likely indicating the attempt to resolve the detected inconsistency and to incorporate it into the schema. Interestingly, schema-inconsistent objects have furthermore been found to be more difficult to recognize and recall correctly, as compared to schema-matching objects (Davenport & Potter, 2004) , and this holds true even when they are placed directly in the center of attention via preceding location cueing (Munneke, Brentari, & Peelen, 2013) .
Several studies show that everyday-life visual scenes or even short videos in which an unfitting object is integrated and thus makes an action unexpected -e.g. a person in the kitchen cutting a loaf of bread with a saw or sewing her hair with a sewing machine -typically elicit a frontal N400 component in the EEG, indicating semantic information processing of the viewed violation (for a review of the action-related N400 see: Amoruso et al., 2013; Proverbio & Riva, 2009) . Some studies additionally found a more posteriorly located late positivity component analogous to the P600 for syntactic processing, in similar real-world related short videos displaying incongruent actions -such as a person ironing bread with a flat iron (Sitnikova et al., 2003 (Sitnikova et al., , 2008 . In order to systematically investigate differences in visual processing of syntax and semantics, Vo and Wolfe (2013) created colored photographs of realworld scenes including objects that either violated the syntax or the semantics of the visual scene. They operationalized syntax as referring to the local positioning of objects within a scene, and semantics referring to the more global relationship of objects to the scene's meaning. For example, a cooking pot hovering above the stove in the kitchen would be considered a strong syntactic inconsistency, a cooking pot lying in the bathtub a semantic inconsistency. They found that semantic inconsistencies elicited an N300/N400 component, and syntactic inconsistencies -depending on the strength of the inconsistency -either a P600 or also an N300 response.
Given the outlined evidence, it seems safe to assume that semantic and syntactic structuring is a useful and ecologically relevant, schemabased approach for describing human perception and understanding of the environment. In this sense, different contexts -such as language processing, listening to music, or viewing a real-world scene -adhere to different schemata which entail distinct and specific semantic and syntactic rules. One specifically interesting context that has not yet been scientifically investigated in terms of semantic and syntactic processing, is that of art viewing. Viewing art partly resembles realworld scene viewing, especially in regards to the perceptual modality employed and the level of complexity involved, but it also importantly differs. In the literature there are several models of how visual processing of art works and which steps are involved (for an overview of existing models see : Pelowski, Markey, Lauring, & Leder, 2016) , almost all of them highlight the role of specific expectations a viewer has when they enter an art-viewing situation. In their model of aesthetic processing, Leder, Belke, Oeberst, and Augustin (2004; updated in Leder & Nadal, 2014) describe how knowledge about the context leads to a specific pre-classification which then influences the following perception and affective evaluation. The key notion here is that when viewing visual art, other expectations are present than when observing a realworld scene, potentially leading to a different schema. While this likely is true for visual art in general -or for that matter for any drawn or painted image -this holds especially true for certain less naturalistic styles of art, such as surrealistic paintings. Here, it can be argued, the main point of the art is to challenge conventional concepts by depicting something that would not be possible in real life. Put more simply, (surrealist) artists make use of the fact that the content of their paintings does not have to strictly adhere to the limitations of reality, and this usually is expected by the viewer. Evidence for this has been found in the form of a more positive emotional evaluation of ambiguous surrealist paintings compared to non-ambiguous ones, as indicated by measuring the electrical activity of facial muscles of the viewers (Jakesch, Goller, & Leder, 2017) .
In the current study we thus address the question to what extent the underlying schema when viewing visual art differs from that when viewing real-world scenes, by testing how this is reflected in neurophysiological response patterns as recorded via EEG. Specifically, we use digital reproductions of surrealistic paintings, similar to those used by Jakesch et al. (2017) , containing inconsistencies which can be classified either as semantic or syntactic ones, following the definition used by Vo and Wolfe (2013) . We investigate whether these semantic and syntactic inconsistencies in paintings elicit the same N300/400 and late positivity/P600 ERP components respectively as in real-world scenes, or whether this is not the case because such consistencies are not unexpected but rather part of the schema in an art-viewing context. In order to do this we compare the original artworks with digitally altered consistent versions of them, as well as with specially created, matched photographic versions that either contain an inconsistency, or are consistent.
We hypothesize 1) that semantic and syntactic inconsistencies are perceived and rated differently from each other, resulting in differences in ERPs; 2) that images containing semantic or syntactic inconsistencies are rated as more inconsistent and elicit more pronounced ERPs than consistent images, but 3) that this might only be the case for photographs, not for paintings.
Material and methods

Participants
Forty participants took part in the experiment and received either course credit or financial remuneration. All participants were righthanded and had normal or corrected to normal vision, they reported not having any history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Eight participants had to be excluded either because of technical failure or because of bad EEG data quality mainly due to excessive motion artifacts. This resulted in 32 participants (9 male, 23 female) whose ages ranged from 18 to 51 years (M age = 24, Mdn age = 21 SD age = 7.03). All participants were art-viewing naïve and unfamiliar with the presented artworks. This was achieved by selecting only those participants from a participant-pool who had previously indicated to have no or only little expertise and interest in visual art, and by inquiring after the testing whether they were familiar with the paintings they had just seen. This experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Vienna.
Stimulus material
We used a set of 47 original artworks by the Belgian surrealist painter René Magritte. Each artwork contained an element that produces either a semantic or a syntactic violation from what one would expect to see in reality (see appendix for the list of names of the artworks). Due to the limitation of using real artworks as images, semantic and syntactic inconsistencies could not be evenly balanced: 29 of the 47 original paintings contained a semantic inconsistency, the others a syntactic one. A semantic inconsistency was present when a depicted object itself was unexpected or unrealistic, whereas a syntactic inconsistency would include an unexpected, unrealistic size or location of an object (see : Vo & Wolfe, 2013) . For example, in "Le Modèle rouge", 1947, a pair of shoes is displayed, of which the front part consists of bare toes of human feet; this presents a semantic inconsistency. In contrast, in "La Reconnaissance Infinie", 1963, two men are displayed who are standing in the sky, i.e. in an unexpected position, which is why this presents a syntactic inconsistency.
For each artwork we then carefully created a consistent version, by digitally editing the image and replacing or modifying the unrealistic element in it (Jakesch et al., 2013 (Jakesch et al., , 2017 . In addition, for each of the resulting consistent artworks we created a photograph that matched the depicted content as closely as possible. This photograph was then digitally altered and an inconsistency was included in order to match the original Magritte artwork as closely as possible. This resulted in a total of 176 different stimuli 1 that can be divided into four different categories per original motif: (a) original artwork with either semantic or syntactic inconsistency, (b) consistent artwork, (c) photography with either semantic or syntactic inconsistency, (d) consistent photography.
Procedure
After written informed consent had been obtained, participants were seated in a dimly lit room, where the stimuli were presented on a 19-inch color VGA monitor with a refresh rate of 85 Hz and a resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels. Participants sat about 60 cm away from the monitor. The stimuli were presented with the E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). No prior information was given to the participants regarding the specific context or purpose of the experiment, except for the title of the study, "Art and Everyday-Life" ("Kunst und Alltag" in German), as well as a statement saying that participants would view different images while their brain responses would be recorded via EEG. This was followed by brief instructions to focus on the fixation cross presented between images, and to minimize movements during the experiment, in order to avoid movement artifacts.
Each participant saw each of the 176 stimuli presented in a random order, after all stimuli had been presented once, they were repeated a second time, again in random order. This was implemented in order to obtain a minimum number of at least 30 trials for every condition, with the goal of ensuring a satisfactory signal-to-noise ratio for the detection of ERPs (see e.g. Luck, 2005) . This procedure resulted in 352 trials altogether; 58 trials with artworks containing semantic inconsistencies, 32 trials with artworks containing syntactic inconsistencies, 94 trials containing consistent artworks, 50 trials containing photographs with semantic inconsistencies, 34 trials containing photographs syntactic inconsistencies, and 84 trials containing consistent photographs. Every trial began with a fixation cross presented for 2000 ms, after which a blurred preview of the painting was presented for 500 ms, in order to be able to control for changes in low level visual features on the computer screen. Then a red dot appeared on-screen for 500 ms ( ± 300 ms jitter) at the exact location where the inconsistency was about to appear. In order to capture participants' attention and to prevent further eyemovements, participants had been instructed to focus on this cued location, as soon as the red dot appeared. Next, the actual, un-blurred painting appeared for 2000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 3000 ms.
Following the repeated presentation of all stimuli, participants finally had to rate each painting regarding how inconsistent they thought it was, on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1, very consistent, to 7, very inconsistent (see Fig. 1 ).
Electrophysiological recording and analysis
The Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with 64 active electrodes (actiCAP System, Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany) positioned according to the international 10/10 system and mounted into a cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching, Germany). The signal was acquired with a sampling rate of 1000 Hz via a full-band DC-EEG system (neuroConn GmbH, Ilmenau, Germany). The ground electrode at AFZ served as an online reference. Data were resampled offline to 250 Hz. Line noise was removed and bad channels were interpolated using the PREP pipeline (Bigdelys Shamlo, Mullen, Kothe, Su, & Robbins, 2015) . Data were then high-pass filtered at 0.1 Hz (finite impulse response (FIR) filter, cutoff frequency: −6dB, 0.0875 Hz, transition band width: 0.025 Hz), and trials with muscle artifacts rejected. After a 1 Hz high-pass filtering (FIR filter, cutoff frequency: −6dB, 0.9875 Hz, transition band width: 0.025 Hz), an independent component analysis (ICA) using the infomax algorithm (Bell & Sejnowski, 1995) was performed. Resulting ICA weights were applied to the 0.1 Hz filtered data and components representing blinks, vertical and horizontal eye movements were then removed. Altogether, pre-processing resulted in a rejection of 14.8% of all trials, with the amount of rejected trials being distributed fairly evenly across the different conditions (16.1% art with inconsistent syntax; 14.5% art with inconsistent semantics; 15.6% consistent art; 15.7% photos with inconsistent syntax; 14% photos with inconsistent semantics; 13.6% consistent photos). All 1 For five paintings it was not possible to create a convincing realistic version, leaving us with 10 less final images. Furthermore, due to technical error two images were not included in the programming script for the experimental presentation, thus 176 images instead of 188 (47 original paintings x 4 different categories). For details on which images were omitted, see Appendix. channels then were re-referenced offline to the average of both mastoids and a 30 Hz low-pass filter (FIR filter, cutoff frequency: −6dB, 31.25 Hz, transition band width: 2.5 Hz) was applied. Data were then segmented into epochs of 2000 ms, and each epoch was baseline adjusted, using the 200 ms preceding each stimulus as baseline. Processing of the data was performed in MATLAB (The MathWorks, MA, USA) using the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) with the ERPLAB extension (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) , along with custom-made scripts.
Results
Behavioral results
In order to assess the inconsistency ratings, we conducted a 3 × 2 repeated measurement ANOVA using Type III Sums of Squares, with inconsistency as one factor -the stimuli could either be consistent, contain a semantic inconsistency, or a syntactic inconsistency -and type as the other factor -the depicted image could either be a painting or a photography. There was a significant main effect for inconsistency, F (1.47, 45.67) = 523.13, p < 0.001, with a Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of departure from sphericity of ε = 0.74. Contrasts revealed that images containing semantic inconsistencies were significantly rated as more inconsistent than consistent images, F(1, 31) = 621.49, p < 0.001, r = 0.98, the same was true for syntactic inconsistencies, F (1, 31) = 604.97, p < 0.001, r = 0.98. Furthermore, syntactic inconsistencies were significantly rated as more inconsistent than semantic inconsistencies, F(1, 31) = 89.92, p < 0.001, r = 0.64. There was a significant main effect for type, F(1, 31) = 61.95, p < 0.001, with paintings being rated as more inconsistent than photographs, r = 0.82. Finally, there was a significant interaction effect between inconsistency and type, F(2, 62) = 3.43, p = 0.039, with a Greenhouse-Geisser estimate for departure from sphericity of ε = 1. To further elucidate this, contrasts were computed, comparing the difference of each type of inconsistent and consistent images between artworks and photographs. These contrasts revealed significant interactions when comparing art to photographs, both for semantic inconsistencies compared to consistent images, F(1, 31) = 5.19, p = 0.03, r = 0.38, and syntactic inconsistencies compared to consistent images, F(1, 31) = 5.11, p = 0.031, r = 0.38. This means that for paintings the difference between each, semantic and syntactic inconsistencies and consistent images is less pronounced than this is the case for photographs (see Fig. 2 ).
ERP results
In order to examine the effect of semantic and syntactic inconsistencies and to be able to compare them to previous findings in the literature, we formed a cluster of electrodes in the midcentral region -FC1, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz and CP2 -which has previously been directly linked to processing of semantic and syntactic inconsistencies in visual scenes (see : Vo & Wolfe, 2013) . Furthermore accordingly, three time windows were defined: 250-350 ms (N300), 350-600 ms (N400), and 600-1000 ms (P600) after stimulus onset. See Fig. 3 for a graphical depiction of the grand average for the ERP waveforms in all six conditions and all three used time windows. We computed scalp maps for the ERP difference waves of semantic and syntactic inconsistencies respectively -subtracting the consistent control images, each for the art (i.e. paintings) and for the real (photographs) condition, as well as for the difference wave of art minus real. The scalp maps show three things clearly: first, the processing patterns of semantic and syntactic inconsistencies are dissociated from each other. Second, a discernibly large part of the difference in the ERP signal across conditions does indeed arise from the selected midcentral electrodes. Third, the difference between viewing paintings and photographs is reflected in the highest voltage differences (see Fig. 4 ). The mean amplitudes for each time window in each condition were extracted, and a two-way repeated measure factorial ANOVA using Type III Sums of Squares, with consistency and type as factors was conducted for each time window.
In the N300 time window (250-350 ms), there was a significant main effect for type, F(1, 31) = 4.18, p = 0.05, r = 0.34, with photographs eliciting a more negative voltage than paintings. However, there was no significant effect for inconsistency, F(1.63, 50.65) = 1.83, p = 0.177, Greenhouse-Geisser ε = 0.83, and no significant interaction, F(1.9, 58.76) = 0.53, Greenhouse-Geisser ε = 0.96. In the N400 time window (350-600 ms) there was a significant main effect for type, F(1, 31) = 7.15, p = 0.012, r = 0.43, as well as for inconsistency, F(1.66, 51.34) = 5.18, p = 0.013, Greenhouse-Geisser ε = 0.83, no significant interaction effect was present, F (1.91, 59.25) = 0.56, Greenhouse-Geisser ε = 0.96. Contrasts revealed that for inconsistency, semantic inconsistencies had a significantly less pronounced negative amplitude than consistent control images, F(1, 31) = 4.37, p = 0.045, r = 0.35, and semantic and syntactic inconsistencies differed significantly from each other, with a more pronounced amplitude for syntactic inconsistencies, F(1, 31) = 7.68, p = 0.009, r = 0.45. However, there was no significant difference between syntactic inconsistencies and consistent controls, F(1, 31) = 2.42, p = 0.125. In the P600 time window (600-1000 ms) we found a significant main effect for type, F(1, 31) = 4.95, p = 0.034, r = 0.37, and for inconsistency, F(1.45, 44.79) = 3.69, p = 0.046, Greenhouse-Geisser ε = 0.72, but no significant interaction, F(1.55, 47.95) = 0.72, Greenhouse-Geisser ε = 0.77. Again, contrasts indicated that there was a significant difference between semantic inconsistencies and consistent control images, with more pronounced positive amplitudes for semantic inconsistencies, F(1, 31) = 8.08, p = 0.008, r = 0.45. The same was true for semantic inconsistencies compared to syntactic ones, F(1, 31) = 4.66, p = 0.039, r = 0.36, but no significant difference was found between syntactic inconsistencies and consistent controls, F(1, 31) = 0.56, p = 0.46 (see Fig. 5 ).
Discussion
The aim of this study was to find out to what extent the perception of semantic and syntactic violations in artworks differs from that of viewing the same violations in more naturalistic visual scenes. In order to investigate this we examined electrophysiological brain responses as recorded via EEG when participants viewed paintings and photographs containing elements that varied in semantic and syntactic inconsistency. Previous studies had shown that in visual scenes an earlier N400 ERP component is usually associated with elements of semantic processing and a later P600 component with syntactic processing (Ganis & Kutas, 2003; Vo & Wolfe, 2013) . We hypothesized that, for viewing art, this might be different, since the underlying expectations for art usually vastly differ from those concerning an everyday-life relevant scenery. Behavioral ratings clearly confirmed that participants indeed strongly distinguished the different kinds of inconsistencies, with paintings being rated as more inconsistent than photographs, and syntactic inconsistencies being perceived as more severe than semantic ones. Furthermore, a significant interaction effect indicated that the processing patterns of inconsistencies differ, depending on whether the perceived picture is a painting or a photograph: photographs elicited larger rating differences between inconsistent and consistent images than did paintings. Since the severity rating of the perceived inconsistency happened at the end of the experiment, and participants had no time constraints for reflecting on their judgment, it has to be noted that the behavioral ratings do not directly correspond to the immediate processing recorded via EEG, and most likely draw from a different process.
In correspondence with the behavioral ratings we found a pronounced difference between viewing a photograph and a painting in all three examined ERP components, the N300, N400 and P600. However, the results were not that entirely clear cut with the different types of inconsistencies. Even though the patterns of activation between semantic and syntactic inconsistencies and consistent control images appeared to be relatively similar in the different time windows, there was no significant difference between the three in the earliest time component, the N300. Only in the later two components, the N400 and the P600, did the amplitude of semantic inconsistencies differ from that of syntactic ones and controls. Remarkably, the pattern of activation suggests that overall, syntactic inconsistencies elicit a more negative waveform than semantic inconsistencies. Thus, the earlier negative components seem to be more strongly influenced by syntactic inconsistencies, whereas the later positive component is substantially driven by semantic inconsistencies. Interestingly, this appears to be the opposite of what has previously been found for viewing inconsistencies in natural realistic scenes, where semantic violations elicit an N300 and N400 and syntactic ones an N400 and P600 (Vo & Wolfe, 2013) .
This pronounced contrast between an artwork related viewing stance in this study and the viewing of naturalistic real-life scenes in previous studies would mainly occur due to two facts. First, artworks are often fictitious scenes that do not necessarily have to adhere to rules of reality and laws of nature: more often, these rules are deliberately and systematically broken, and therefore the violation of these rules can become a more normative expectation in an art-context. Second (and related), it can be argued that when one sees or expects to see an artwork, one automatically applies a different viewing schema, usually involving more aesthetic expectations (for studies empirically investigating this, see : Gerger, Leder, & Kremer, 2014; Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christensen, & Zeki, 2009; Van Dongen, Van Strien, & Dijkstra, 2016; Wagner et al., 2016; Wagner, Menninghaus, Hanich, & Jacobsen, 2014) , which is associated with specific (neuro)physiological activity patterns already at a relatively early time-frame, reflecting an automatic reaction (Leder, Markey, & Pelowski, 2015; Pelowski, Markey, Forster, Gerger, & Leder, 2017) . This provides a parsimonious explanation for our observation of less pronounced amplitudes for paintings than for photographs in the earlier, negative components. In this light, it would be tempting to conclude that when viewing art and/ or applying an aesthetic viewing schema, inconsistencies that go against naturalistic expectations are simply more expected, and therefore less inconsistent. This explanation was, however, only partly supported by the observed data, as we only found a type x consistency interaction effect in the behavioral ratings, but not for the ERP components.
Yet, the significantly lower ERP amplitude for photographs in the N300 and N400 might still emerge due to the situational context and expectations arising from it. It has been established that underlying expectations importantly guide our viewing behavior (Oliva & Torralba, 2007) which then influences the perception of semantic and syntactic inconsistencies in visual scenes (Vo & Henderson, 2009 ). This even goes as far as that visual inconsistencies don't bind attention per se, they can be overlooked and tend to be rationalized (Mack, Clarke, Erol, & Bert, 2017) and are difficult to detect even when attention is guided directly towards them (Munneke et al., 2013) . Even though caution should be exercised when assuming that participants in an experimental study judge something to be art, as this cannot be automatically assumed (Pelowski, Gerger, Chetouani, Markey, & Leder, 2017) , it seems likely that this was the case in the present study. Participating in a study about art, with digital reproductions of oil paintings and photorealistic counterparts containing elements typically found in artworks, might have led the participants to expect a (painted) art stimulus as default, and in this context the real photographs were the odd ones out, having a higher contextual inconsistency. It has to be noted that the fact that participants behaviorally rated paintings and their inconsistencies as more inconsistent than photographs and their inconsistencies seems to contradict this explanation. However, as stated above, since the behavioral rating of the images happened later on and without time constraints, it is likely that it is based on different underlying cognitive processes than the immediate viewing of the pictures, reflecting the fact that inconsistencies are considered to be an important component of art and therefore rated as more prominent, in line with art schema expectations. In order to further explore the possible effect of a top-down art-context, it would be interesting for future studies to present everyday-relevant visual scenes, such as those employed by Vo and Wolfe (2013) , and frame them as art, investigating how they are perceived and processed. Furthermore, it remains a limitation of the current study that it did not include a rating task in which participants were asked to indicate how much they consider each presented stimulus to be art. This would have allowed to directly examine if participants had indeed adopted a general art viewing schema; therefore such a task should be included in future similar studies.
The pronounced positive amplitude for semantic inconsistencies in the P600 time window can most likely be explained by the fact that the presented semantic violations were perhaps not immediately attentioncapturing but difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. They therefore still are being processed and trying to be understood after 600 ms. To give an illustrative example, a person hovering in the air (syntactic inconsistency) can relatively easily be understood, whereas an object that is both bottle and carrot at the same time (semantic inconsistency), takes much longer to be fully perceived and understood. (Where does the carrot end? Where does the bottle end? Is it a carrot stuck inside a bottleneck, or perhaps a partly orange colored bottle? etc.)
Concluding, it can be said that we presented stimuli that were as ecologically valid as possible for an art-related processing mode, i.e. digital reproductions of real oil paintings by a renowned artist, including modified versions. The early processing of inconsistencies in these artworks, recorded via EEG, differed from that shown in previous studies with everyday-life relevant scenes (Vo & Wolfe, 2013) , suggesting that there is indeed an art-related processing mode or schema influencing perception. Consequently, it stands to reason that such an art schema that is active when viewing paintings (or other artworks or non-naturalistic images) would have its own set of underlying rules, i.e. specific ways of defining structure and meaning, distinct from those rules found in everyday-life relevant naturalistic settings. What exact rules this could be, and how far this schema can be stretched in contemporary art, will be exciting questions for future research to investigate.
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